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Can Temporary Employment Scar Your Future Earnings?
Wage Mobility by Type of Work Contract in Spain
The 1990s have been characterized by the rapid growth of nonstandard work
arrangements, particularly in Spain, where temporary workers have accounted for more than onethird of the workforce over the past decade. It is difficult to generalize because temporary
workers are heterogeneous, but concern arises that they are the most likely to incur fewer
opportunities for career advancement and to receive lower wages. Less opportunity for
advancement may inflict long-term harm due to lack of access to better jobs and higher earnings,
while low wages contribute to poverty.
Using Spanish data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), we have
examined the effects of temporary work of different durations on current and future wages while
accounting for the worker’s recent job mobility and job search patterns. We find that while
temporary workers earn approximately 5 percent less at a given point in time than permanent
workers, they experience greater wage growth than their permanent counterparts in the short run.
In particular, temporary workers’ wages are 6 percent higher than those of their permanent
counterparts a year later, once we account for recent job mobility and job search patterns.
Various factors might explain this finding. Temporary workers’ greater wage growth
might represent the payoff to their greater effort in order to keep their jobs or a compensating
wage differential for worse working conditions. Alternatively, in an environment of high
unemployment, a permanent worker may suffer a substantial wage penalty when switching jobs if
employers perceive of them as “damaged goods,” whereas job changing among temporary
workers is not extraordinary.
We also find that the wage gaps between temporary and permanent workers and the wage
growth experienced by temporary workers vary substantially with the duration of the temporary
work contract. In particular, relative to permanent workers and accounting for recent job
mobility and job search practices, temporary workers with up to six-month contracts earn
approximately 5 percent less than their temporary counterparts. Interestingly, their wage gap
widens to 11 percent a year later, possibly due to the interrupted employment patterns typically
associated with this short-term work category.
On the other hand, longer-term temporary workers (e.g., those with one-year contracts or
one-year or more contracts) might experience a wage gap in some instances (such as in the case
of work contracts lasting more than six months and up to one year), but they also enjoy greater
wage growth than their permanent counterparts. As a result, their wages are 4–6 percent higher
than those of similar permanent co-workers a year later. This finding emphasizes the different
nature of short-term and long-term temporary employment, with long-term temporary contracts

displaying better future employment prospects and thus possibly inducing greater employee work
effort.
In sum, our results indicate that while temporary workers earn significantly less than their
counterparts, their earnings quickly improve. Within the period of one year, only employees
holding short, six-month contracts continue to earn significantly less, while employees holding
longer-lived temporary work contracts experience greater wage growth than their permanent
counterparts. This finding has important policy implications, since policies targeting the poverty
consequences of temporary employment might differ depending on the duration of such effects.
Given the high percentage of workers employed in temporary work arrangements, the
reliance of welfare-to-work programs on these work contracts to alleviate poverty, and the
observed poverty recidivism among welfare leavers employed in temporary jobs in a variety of
countries, these findings provide important policy lessons for the regulation and use of the
shortest-lived temporary work contracts.
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